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JUDICIAL POWER AND THE 
CHARTER: THREE MYTHS AND 
A POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
Christopher P. Manfredi
* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Does the Supreme Court exercise “too much” judicial power under the 
Charter? Consider that over 22 years (1960-1982), the federal Bill of Rights 
generated 34 Supreme Court decisions, five successful claims, and only one 
partial nullification of a federal statute.
1
 During the same period, the number of 
constitutional decisions issued by the Court totalled 120, or less than six per 
year.
2
 By contrast, over its first 17 years of operation (1982-1999) the Charter 
generated 390 Supreme Court decisions, 130 successful claims, and 63 
nullifications of federal or provincial statutes.
3
 As these comparisons affirm, and 
as everyone acknowledges, the scope of judicial power has increased under the 
Charter. But has it increased “too much?” 
In September, 2000 the Chief Justice of Canada responded to those who 
might answer this question affirmatively by delivering a speech entitled 
“Judicial Power and Democracy.”4 Noting the “global expansion of judicial 
power,” the Chief Justice nevertheless argued that “[o]ur task is not to curtail 
________________________________________________________________ 
* Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, McGill University. This paper 
was originally presented at the April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: 
Fourth Annual Analysis of the Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the 
Professional Development Program at Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1
 Russell, The Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987), at 343. 
2
 Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1987), at 21. 
3
 Data for 1982-1997 are found in Kelly, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997” (1999), 37:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. at 
625. Professor Kelly graciously provided me with the data for 1998-99. 
4
 McLachlin C.J.C., “Judicial Power and Democracy” (Academy Annual Lecture 2000, 
Singapore Academy of Law, 14 September 2000) [available at <www.sal.org.sg/a_al00sp.htm>, 
accessed 25 January 2001]. 
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judicial power but to understand how it may most effectively contribute to the 
just society.” In pursuit of this purpose, the Chief Justice identified three 
misperceptions, or myths, about judicial power. These myths are: (1) that 
judicial power is “the enemy of democratic government”; (2) that judicial law-
making is a novel phenomenon; and (3) that law-making should be the 
exclusive responsibility of legislatures. When these myths are dismissed, 
according to the Chief Justice, “judicial law-making thus emerges not as the 
enemy of democratic government, but as an essential feature of it.” 
In this paper, I attempt to explain why some Court observers, especially 
among political scientists, are not persuaded by the Chief Justice‟s arguments. I 
do so by also discussing three myths about judicial power and the Charter, 
although they are not the same ones identified by the Chief Justice. Perhaps 
surprisingly, I agree with the Chief Justice that judicial power is an essential 
feature of democratic government, but I disagree that there is something 
exceptional about that power. The myths I discuss serve to obscure the 
inherently political nature of Charter review, and like all myths they each 
contain a grain of truth that lend them credibility. I refer specifically to the 
vacuum, guardian and dialogue myths. 
II. THE VACUUM MYTH 
The vacuum myth is that rights-based judicial policymaking is necessary 
because legislatures are unwilling to grapple with difficult or divisive issues. 
As the Chief Justice said in her “Judicial Power” speech: “If the legislature 
does not provide the outlet, dissatisfied citizens will cast their concerns in the 
language of rights and turn to the courts, and the courts will have little choice 
but to hear them.” There is, of course, an element of truth in this. Governments 
are willing to deflect difficult issues to courts, as the Ontario government did 
with respect to funding for Roman Catholic schools. The Chief Justice is also 
correct to suggest that individuals and groups who fail to achieve their policy 
objectives in legislatures will turn to courts for action. Beyond these grains of 
truth, however, there are at least two problems with this myth. 
The less important of the two is the assertion that courts are the passive 
servants of initiatives taken by independent litigants. While this is a largely fair 
characterization of lower courts, it does not hold for the Supreme Court. 
Contrary to what Chief Justice McLachlin is reported to have told the Canadian 
Bar Association last August,
5
 the Court exercises tremendous agenda-setting 
________________________________________________________________ 
5
 According to newspaper reports, the Chief Justice emphasized the Court‟s passivity. She 
claimed that in contrast to politicians, judges have virtually no power to set their own agendas, and 
rely entirely on litigants to decide what issues enter the judicial arena. See Tibbets, “Top judge 
defends court‟s role in fishing spat: Native rights ruling” National Post (21 August 2000) A7. 
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powers through its discretion over leaves to appeal and threshold issues like 
standing and mootness. As its own statistics indicate, it grants less than 15% of 
the applications for leave that it receives.
6
 In addition, since 1981 the Court has 
gradually replaced categorical rules of standing and mootness with discretionary 
ones.
7
 Finally, the Court‟s control over the interpretation and application of 
section 1 of the Charter gives it tremendous discretion to expand and contract the 
concept of “reasonable limits.” So, while it is true that the Court does not control 
which issues enter the judicial process, it does control the issues it will decide.  
The more problematic aspect of the vacuum myth is illustrated by the Court‟s 
treatment of the mootness issue in M. v. H.
8
 After deciding that the case was not 
moot, Justice Peter Cory observed that, “even if the appeal were moot, it would 
be appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion in order to decide these 
important issues.” According to Justice Cory, the “social cost of leaving this 
matter undecided would be significant.”9 The problem with this statement is that 
the matter had not been left undecided. The Ontario government had attempted to 
amend the statutory definition of spouse in the Family Law Act,10 and following a 
vigorous, divisive and sometimes bitter debate, the Ontario legislature defeated 
the amendment in a free vote. To argue that judicial intervention was necessary 
in this instance because the legislature was unwilling to tackle a controversial 
issue simply misstates the facts. Instead, the Court‟s intervention appears to 
have been driven not so much by legislative inaction as by disagreement with 
the outcome of the process. 
Indeed, at times the Court seems to exercise judicial power not because of 
legislative inaction, but “to correct a democratic process that has acted 
improperly.”11 While the Court certainly has the power to nullify or otherwise 
modify unconstitutional legislation, the standards for determining whether the 
democratic process has acted so improperly as to require judicial correction are 
unclear. Despite the Court‟s attempt to anchor the power of judicial review in 
its status as an independent adjudicative body with special expertise and 
________________________________________________________________ 
6
 See Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 1988-
1998. Social scientists are just now beginning to study the factors underlying leave to appeal 
decisions. See Flemming, “The Selection of Appeals for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court of 
Canada: A Multivariate Model” (2000 Annual Meeting, Canadian Political Science Association, 
Quebec City, 29 July-1 August 2000). 
7
 See Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal 
Constitutionalism, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 21, 82. 
8
 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
9
 Id., at para. 44. 
10
 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. 
11
 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 176. 
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responsibility in constitutional matters, judgments like M. v. H. simply affirm 
its character as a political institution.
12
 
III. THE GUARDIAN MYTH 
The basic form of this myth is that the “Charter entrenched the role of judges 
as interpreters and guardians of the rights it guaranteed.”13 This myth made its 
most recent appearance in United States of America v. Burns, where the Court 
said explicitly that it “is the guardian of the Constitution.”14 In considering the 
constitutionality of “extradition without assurances,” the Court saw itself as 
protecting the “basic constitutional value”15 that “in the Canadian view of 
fundamental justice, capital punishment is unjust and should be stopped.”16 But if 
this is the Canadian view of fundamental justice, then why did the Minister of 
Justice agree to extradite without assurances? The Court‟s reasoning leaves only 
two explanations: ignorance of, or disregard for, this principal of fundamental 
justice. Yet there is a third explanation — the current status of capital punishment 
in Canada is not a constitutionally-entrenched principal of fundamental justice, 
but a contemporary policy choice that is subject to revision. 
The guardian myth flows from two related and problematic assumptions. 
First, that the Charter‟s meaning exists independently of judicial interpretation; 
and second, that Charter interpretation is predominantly, and perhaps 
exclusively, a legal exercise. Both of these assumptions are evident in the 
following sentences from the Chief Justice‟s “Judicial Power” speech: “There 
must be a body that determines whether the legislature is acting within its 
powers under the constitution. That body must be judicial, since the issue is a 
legal issue.”17 To quote Justice Wilson, the judiciary is simply “an agency to 
monitor compliance” with the rules set down in the Charter.18 
One difficulty that a political scientist has with this characterization of judicial 
power is that for over half a century this discipline has rejected the view that 
judicial decision-making in final courts of appeal is driven by legal 
________________________________________________________________ 
12
 The Court‟s ability to make political calculations is also evident in two additional 
features of M. v. H. First, it appeared to learn a lesson from the controversy that followed its Vriend 
remedy, and moderated the impact of its judgment by not reading a new definition of spouse into 
the Family Law Act and by suspending its remedy for six months. Second, it released the judgment 
in the midst of a provincial election campaign, thereby insulating it from government criticism. 
13
 Hon. Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Legislatures and Executives in the Post-Charter 
Era” (June 1999), 20(3) Policy Options Politiques 43. 
14
 United States of America v. Burns (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 2001 SCC 7, at para. 35. 
15
  Id., at para. 35. 
16
 Id., para. 84. 
17
 McLachlin C.J.C., supra, note 4, at 7. 
18
 Wilson J., “We Didn‟t Volunteer” (March 1999), 20(5) Policy Options Politiques 9. 
(2001), 14 S.C.L.R. (2d)    Judicial Power and the Charter 335 
 
Job Name: SCLR14      Time:00:10       1st proofs  Date:Saturday, February 11, 2012 
considerations.
19
 Cases reach these courts precisely because the applicable legal 
rules are ambiguous, and legal ambiguity enhances the importance of policy 
considerations in judicial decision-making. This disciplinary attitude is especially 
strong when analyzing judicial power under the Charter because of the 
importance of the reasonable limits clause in section 1. In most Charter cases, the 
dispute is reduced to a conflict about the minimal impairment prong of the 
proportionality component of the Oakes test. However the Court defines 
“minimal impairment,” it simply does not provide a legal standard for evaluating 
government action.  
A second difficulty with these assumptions is that they tend to blur the 
distinction between the Charter as a constitutional document and the meaning 
attached to that document by the Court. This is particularly apparent in judicial 
attitudes toward the use of the notwithstanding clause. For example, in her 
1999 article the Chief Justice explained legislative unwillingness to invoke 
section 33 as flowing from the difficulty legislators face in saying “to the 
people ... „Notwithstanding your rights, we are going to violate them‟ ... 
Individual rights have substance and they should not be lightly cast aside.”20 
Similarly, in Vriend v. Alberta, Justice John Major noted that section 33 allows 
legislatures to “override the Charter breach” identified by the Court.21 These 
statements only make sense if one assumes that judicial decisions alone 
determine the Charter‟s meaning, and that the Court is almost never wrong 
about the substantive content of rights (although it may be mistaken in 
individual cases about the best way to protect the right in question). 
Underlying this myth is a powerful modern syllogism about judicial power: 
The Constitution is supreme law; courts are the authoritative source of the 
Constitution; therefore, courts are the authoritative source of supreme law. But 
what if we reject the second premise in this syllogism and refuse to privilege 
judicially articulated Charter values and requirements? Nothing in liberal 
constitutional theory assigns the task of constitutional interpretation exclusively 
to courts, and constitutions do not exist solely as tools for judicial review. As 
Mark Tushnet argues, the “misplaced allocation of sole constitutional 
responsibility to the courts” debilitates democracy as it distorts policy.22 
To be sure, there is widespread denial that courts exercise “sole 
constitutional responsibility.” Indeed, the Court celebrated its 1999 judgment in 
R. v. Mills as proof that “courts do not hold a monopoly on the protection and 
________________________________________________________________ 
19
 Baum, The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1997), at 57. 
20
 McLachlin C.J.C., supra, note 13, at 45. 
21
 Vriend, supra, note 11, at para. 197. 
22
 Tushnet, “Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty” (1995), 94 Mich. L. Rev. 261. 
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promotion of rights and freedoms.”23 Such denials, however, simply perpetuate 
a third myth about judicial power, which is embodied in the so-called dialogue 
metaphor. 
IV. THE DIALOGUE MYTH 
This is probably the most important myth that now exists about judicial 
power and the Charter. The “dialogue metaphor” became an explicit part of the 
Supreme Court‟s vocabulary in Vriend.24 According to Justice Frank Iacobucci, 
the Charter redefined Canadian democracy to establish a “more dynamic 
interaction among the branches of governance.”25 Justice Iacobucci 
characterized this interaction as a dialogue about the proper balance between 
individual rights and collective purposes. 
During the past year the dialogue metaphor appeared explicitly in Justice 
Iacobucci‟s partial dissent in Little Sisters. Noting that the “Court has 
frequently recognized the importance of fostering a dialogue between courts 
and legislatures,” Iacobucci J. urged his colleagues to strike down the 
impugned Customs regulations in order to “encourage much needed changes.”26 
The metaphor also hovered conspicuously in the background in Justice 
Gonthier‟s judgment for the Court in R. v. Darrach. His somewhat oblique 
reference to the metaphor came in a citation to the Court‟s 1999 Mills 
judgment, where he stressed that insisting on “ „slavish conformity‟ by 
Parliament to judicial pronouncements „would belie the mutual respect that 
underpins the relationship‟ between the two institutions.”27 
Mills is particularly important in assessing the dialogue metaphor. In Mills 
the Court upheld the so-called “privacy shield” amendment to the Criminal 
Code, enacted as a legislative sequel to the Court‟s 1995 O’Connor28 judgment. 
Commentators hailed Mills as evidence of an effective judicial-legislative 
________________________________________________________________ 
23
 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at paras. 55-58. Note that the Court did not deny that it 
holds a monopoly on the interpretation of rights and freedoms. 
24
 Justice Iacobucci drew the metaphor from Hogg & Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue 
Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter Isn‟t Such a Bad Thing After All)” 
(1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. For an exchange about this article, see Manfredi & Kelly, “Six 
Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell” (1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513, and 
Hogg & Thornton, “Reply to „Six Degrees of Dialogue‟ ” (1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. 
25
 Vriend, supra, note 11, at para. 138. 
26
 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
1120, 2000 SCC 69, at para. 268. 
27
 R. v. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, 2000 SCC 46, at para. 34, citing Mills, supra, note 
23, at para. 55. 
28
 R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
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dialogue,
29
 and the Court emphasized its willingness to uphold a legislative 
scheme that “differs significantly” from its earlier judgment. The problem is 
that, although Bill C-46 departed from the five-justice O’Connor majority 
judgment, it did conform slavishly to the minority judgment. Indeed, section 
278.5(2) of the Criminal Code30 is taken virtually word for word from Justice 
L‟Heureux-Dubé‟s judgment.31 Similarly, in Darrach the Court upheld a 
legislative scheme that was simply “a codification by Parliament of the Court‟s 
guidelines in Seaboyer.”32 If any dialogue occurred in these two instances, it 
was among the justices themselves. 
 
V. A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL POWER 
If none of these myths adequately captures the truth about judicial power 
under the Charter, what is the alternative? From the perspective of political 
science the Supreme Court is, first and foremost, a political institution: it makes 
policy not as an accidental by-product of performing its legal function, but 
because its members believe that certain rules will be socially beneficial. The 
Charter increases judicial policymaking power because it expands the range of 
social and political issues subject to the Court‟s jurisdiction. The best example 
is the Court‟s sexual orientation judgments, where it identified policy errors, 
used section 15 to assert jurisdiction over the errors, and then articulated 
corrective policies. 
If this characterization is true, what explains the apparent deference or restraint 
in Charter cases during the past year? The Court is a strategic player in the 
policymaking game.
33
 In high profile cases courts must balance the pursuit of 
immediate policy objectives against long-term institutional legitimacy. More 
precisely, they must ask the following question: How far can we intervene before 
provoking a negative reaction from other political actors that might undermine 
our constitutional authority? Courts must therefore be cognizant of the capacity of 
other political actors to negate specific policy decisions or to challenge the 
legitimacy of the institution itself. In particular, the Court must avoid provoking 
the legislative override because it represents a double blow to achieving judicial 
goals. On the one hand, it negates the effects of the Court‟s immediate 
intervention in the policy process. On the other hand, it challenges the Court‟s 
long-term institutional authority by immunizing an issue from judicial review. 
________________________________________________________________ 
29
 Makin, “Top Court Bows to Will of Parliament” The Globe and Mail (26 November 
1999) A1, A9. 
30
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
31
 See Manfredi, supra, note 7, at 180-82. 
32
 Darrach, supra, note 27, at para. 20. 
33
 See Epstein & Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington: CQ Press, 1998) for a 
description of the strategic model of judicial decision-making. 
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Let me therefore borrow a different metaphor — the “separation of powers 
game”34 — to understand the judicial-legislative relationship under the Charter. 
According to this metaphor, the relationship is conceptualized as one of 
strategic interaction between different political actors to establish rules that will 
structure outcomes in a manner favourable to them. Rights-based judicial 
review is redistributive on two levels: it redistributes power among society-
based actors and between different components of government. 
This strategic interaction can be modelled, although in an obviously 
simplified way, in game-theoretic terms (see Figure 1). In brief, the game 
begins when a group or individual challenges the constitutionality of 
legislation. The game‟s first move belongs to the Court, which has a choice 
among three options. It can defer to the legislature, uphold the legislation and 
leave the status quo (SQ) intact. Alternatively, it can declare the legislation 
unconstitutional, and either nullify it under section 52 of the Constitution Act35 
or impose a different policy, either directly through section 24(1) or indirectly 
through the instructions contained in its section 1 analysis. If the Court nullifies 
or imposes, the next move belongs to the legislature. In the event of 
nullification, the legislature can defer to the Court, pass an alternative law, or 
override the Court‟s judgment by invoking section 33. Legislative deference 
produces a policy vacuum (V); alternative legislation produces a new status quo 
(SQ’) that could be challenged later; and an override produces a reinforced 
status quo (SQ!) that is immune to Charter review for at least five years. In the 
event of judicial policy imposition, legislative choice is reduced to two: 
deference or override. The first choice produces the Court‟s ideal policy (CI), 
while the second produces a reinforced status quo (SQ!). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
MODELLING JUDICIAL-LEGISLATIVE INTERACTION 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
34
 Segal, “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts” 
(1997), 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 28. 
35
  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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In Charter cases the Court has unlimited discretion to defer to, nullify or replace 
the challenged policy. Like other political actors, its decisions “represent a complex 
individualized judicial calculus enveloped by external and social forces.”36 Judges, 
this approach argues, pursue their personal and institutional goals in an environment 
characterized by uncertainty over outcomes. Although they must justify their 
decisions in legal terms, their choice among a wide array of alternative legal 
outcomes and justifications is the product of strategic considerations. Their most 
important calculation concerns the potential likelihood of successful legislative 
resistance to the Court‟s judgments. Judicial activism, in the form of increasingly 
intrusive remedies, increases when the Court perceives fewer institutional 
constraints on its ability to assert constitutional supremacy. 
The 18th century Blackstonian rhetoric that is often used to describe judicial 
power under the Charter, even by members of the Supreme Court itself, should 
not disguise its political character. Nor should the rhetoric of democratic 
humility so prevalent in many of the Court‟s recent judgments mask the reality 
of an institution whose growing control of constitutional interpretation means 
that public policy will inevitably be set closer to judicial rather than to 
legislative preferences. 
________________________________________________________________ 
36
 Haynie, “Judging in Black and White: Decision Making in the South African Appellate 
Division, 1950-1990” (2000) [unpublished manuscript on file with the author], at 177. 
